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Abstract 
Large-N studies suggest that democracy aid is effective, while multiple small-N investigations call 
such findings into question. This paper accounts for this contradiction and significantly improves 
our understanding of democracy aid effectiveness by examining effectiveness in different regime 
types and disaggregating democracy aid into specific types. We argue that democracy aid is more 
likely to be effective when it does not pose a threat to regime survival and when it matches the 
democratic deficits in a country. Analysis of OECD aid and Varieties of Democracy data for 120 
countries from 2002-2012 supports our argument.          
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Introduction 
Democratic promotion efforts by foreign governments and international organizations have 
proliferated since the end of the Cold War. However, the utility of democracy promotion has 
increasingly been challenged. Practitioners are particularly concerned about the future of 
democracy aid as authoritarianism seems to be on the rise again.2 In order to make sound decisions 
about future democracy aid, it is essential to understand to what extent and under what conditions 
democracy aid is effective.  
So far, the scholarly community has reached mixed conclusions about the effectiveness of 
democracy aid. Large-N cross-national studies mainly suggest that the overall effect of democracy 
aid on democratization has been positive.3 However, case studies and qualitative accounts provide 
more critical assessments.4 In particular, scepticism about democracy aid to authoritarian regimes 
is rising.5       
Large-N studies of democracy aid have not adequately addressed such challenges because 
they mainly have focused on average effects of democracy aid irrespective of regime type in the 
recipient country. Yet, considering differential effects of democracy aid in different regime types 
may be the key to reconciling divergent findings in qualitative and quantitative research on 
democracy aid effectiveness. Thus far, only Cornell considered this question.6  However, she 
examines democracy aid effectiveness only in the autocratic regime spectrum. We argue that it is 
essential to understand democracy aid effectiveness in democracies, too. Electoral democracies 
received  a large proportion of democracy aid – one third of the total amount between 2002 and 
2012.7 Furthermore, much democracy aid targets countries while they lack intact regimes – for 
instance recently in Afghanistan, Iraq and Bosnia Herzegovina. Therefore, we study such 
regimeless countries separate from countries with intact regimes. The examination of democracy 
aid effectiveness across the full range of political regimes, including different authoritarian and 
democratic regimes as well as regimeless countries are key innovations of our study.  
Theoretically, we argue that aid is more likely to be effective when two conditions are met. 
First, when aid does not threaten the regime—either because it does not challenge leaders’ survival 
strategies or because no intact regime exists in a country—aid is effective. When aid challenges 
                                               
2 Bush, Taming of Democracy Assistance; Carothers, “Democracy Aid at 25" and Diamond, “Democratic Recession". 
3  Finkel et al., “U.S. Democracy Aid"; Kalyvitis and Vlachaki, “Democracy Aid" and Scott and Steele, “U.S. 
Democracy Aid". 
4 Burnell, Promoting Democracy; Peou, Democracy Aid in Cambodia; Whitehead, "International Components"; Zeeuw, 
“Post-Conflict" 
5 Bush, Taming of Democracy Assistance and Schlumberger, "Dancing with Wolves".   
6 Cornell, “Regime Type and Democracy Aid"; Cornell, Limited Role. 
7 See Table 2.  
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leaders’ survival strategies, they will prevent it from promoting democracy. Second, when 
democracy aid addresses democratic deficits in a country, it is more likely to be successful. As a 
result, we expect democracy aid to be effective when the threat to regime survival is low and 
democratic deficiencies are high.   
In order to test these theoretical claims, we divide regimes into four types, each with a 
specific combination of regime survival strategies and democratic deficits -  closed autocracies, 
electoral autocracies, electoral democracies and liberal democracies; and add a fifth category of 
regimeless countries.8  
By using aid data in a novel way and leveraging the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) 
dataset, we can advance the study of democracy aid effectiveness empirically. These empirical 
innovations allow us to examine the effectiveness of democracy aid in a more detailed, 
comprehensive, and accurate manner than previous research. We use aid data from the 
Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member states that target 
the core of democracy —civil society, elections, media, and human rights—rather than the blunter 
aggregate governance and rule of law aid measures typically used.9 Donors often report activities 
as aid for governance and rule of law, which are not directly related to democracy, but to security 
and state-building.10 Especially in countries with autocratic regimes such aid could be used for 
repression and co-optation, not democratization. Our reliance on OECD data distinguishes our 
work from most prior studies, which examine aid from only the U.S.11 Other donors account for 
approximately two-thirds of democracy aid and typically differ in approach and focus, making it 
essential to examine the larger set of donors.12 Finally, whereas most studies on democracy aid rely 
on data about commitments, we use disbursement data.13 Only actually implemented projects can 
be expected to have an effect.  
Our findings are consistent with our main argument. We find that aggregate democracy 
aid is effective when overall the threat to regime survival is low and democratic deficiencies are 
high; this is supported by our results showing that: (1) democracy aid is most effective in countries 
without an intact regime, where aid does not pose a threat to regime survival and democratic 
deficiencies are high; (2) that democracy aid is moderately effective in electoral autocracies and 
                                               
8 Lührmann et al., Regimes in the World. 
9 OECD, OECD Stat. Birch, Electoral Malpractice; Bush, Taming of Democracy Assistance 57; Dietrich and Wright, “Foreign 
Aid and Change" 222; Finkel et al., “U.S. Democracy Aid" 434. 
10 For example, the United States included large-scale counter-narcotics and security and law enforcement programs 
in countries such as Mexico, Afghanistan, and Colombia as aid in the sector of “legal and judicial development.” 
OECD, OECD Stat. 
11 Finkel et al., “U.S. Democracy Aid"; Scott and Steele, “U.S. Democracy Aid". 
12 OECD, OECD Stat; Pospieszna, Polish Democracy Aid; Youngs, “European Democracy Assistance" 
13 Birch, “Electoral Systems"; Dietrich and Wright, “Foreign Aid and Change"; Cornell, Limited Role; Kalyvitis and 
Vlachaki, “Democracy Aid". 
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electoral democracies, where in the former aid poses a moderate threat but democratic deficiencies 
are high and in the latter aid poses no threat but democratic deficiencies are not that high; and (3) 
democracy aid is not effective in closed autocracies, where it would substantially threaten the 
regime, and in liberal democracies, where the democratic deficiencies are minimal.  
The effectiveness of democracy aid in three out of five regime types also explains why we 
– as many prior studies – find a positive overall effect of democracy aid. In order to investigate to 
what extent this positive overall effect is driven by specific types of aid, we break down the analysis 
by sector - civil society, elections, media, and human rights. Aid shows overall positive effects in 
the area they target, suggesting that no single specific type of aid accounts for the positive overall 
effect.   
In sum, this paper makes theoretical, empirical, and methodological contributions that 
enable it to account for the puzzling discrepancies between the findings from large-N and small-
N studies. Whereas democracy aid tends to be effective, on average, globally, as large-N studies 
have shown, democracy aid is less effective under certain regime types, as case studies have 
demonstrated. Our theoretical framework, data, and methodological approach demonstrate how 
these two sets of seemingly contradictory findings are complementary. This clarification 
significantly improves our understanding of democracy aid effectiveness and offers insights for 
policymakers and practitioners.   
The paper proceeds by first describing the theoretical argument and presenting the 
hypotheses. The second section uses data about democracy aid patterns to demonstrate the 
relevance of examining aid to countries with different regime types as well as specific types of aid. 
Then we elaborate on the data and methods and present the results.  The final section considers 
implications of our findings.  
 
I. Theoretical Framework 
Democracy aid is international development assistance with the “specific goal [to] foster and 
advance democratization.”14 It typically includes promotion of civil society, free and fair elections, 
free media, and human rights. In examining aggregate democracy aid effectiveness, the outcome 
we are seeking to explain is incremental movements toward more democratic practices, rather than 
a full transition to democracy. This definition of effectiveness is empirically grounded: most studies 
have found incremental improvements rather than complete transitions.15  
                                               
14 Carothers, “Democracy Aid at 25," 59. 
15 e.g. Carothers, Learning Curve, 304. 
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Our focus is on why aid that enters a country is successfully implemented in some cases 
but not others—not on how it is allocated.16 We argue that democracy aid is more likely to be 
effective when two conditions are present: 1) when the aid does not pose a threat to the regime—
either because it does not challenge leaders’ survival strategies or the country lacks an intact regime, 
and 2) when there are democratic deficits in a country.  
A threat to a regime is something that will likely weaken its grip on power. Most countries 
have intact regimes, so the regimes are essentially gatekeepers to aid implementation.17 Therefore, 
regimes will prevent aid that threatens their survival from being implemented as it is intended. For 
example, a strong civil society poses a threat to certain types of regimes, so those ruling elites are 
likely to try and divert aid aimed at improving independent civic groups’ organizational capacity to 
more government-friendly groups.18 When democracy aid challenges their survival strategy, leaders 
will ensure that the aid is squandered or redirect it for their own purposes. 
However, not all democracy aid challenges the survival strategies of regimes. Leaders of 
democratic regimes tend to accept democratic institutions and practices, so democracy aid aligns 
with their regime survival strategy. Democracy aid can also be compatible with survival strategies 
of autocratic leaders. De jure democratic institutions are an increasingly important part of regime 
survival strategies for non-democratic political regimes.19 Government leaders can actively use 
democracy aid to strengthen their own positions.20 For example, aid for elections, parliament, and 
political parties can help  authoritarian stabilization. Elections can be instrumental for signalling 
popular support, and a show of popular support can deter rivals within the national elite.21 
Elections, as well as parliaments, can be used to co-opt opponents and thus further secure the 
incumbents’ positions.22 The establishment of political parties seems to lower the risk of forced 
removal from office. 23  Because much democracy aid consists of technical assistance, it can 
strengthen the capacity of governments to, for example, run elections and carry out judicial and 
bureaucratic processes, without allowing  more independent institutions or providing a more level 
playing field.24  
                                               
16 An examination of donors’ decisions about where to give aid is beyond the scope of the paper. Note that even for 
regimes that could be threatened by democracy aid there can be benefits to agreeing to accepting it but then preventing 
its successful implementation. Benefits include, for example, a pro-democratic appearance that can result in greater 
foreign aid, and reduce pressure from internal opponents. 
17 Tolstrup, “Gatekeepers and Linkages". 
18 Bush, Taming of Democracy Assistance, 61. 
19 Schedler, “Menu of Manipulation"; Schedler, Politics of Uncertainty; Roessler and Howard, "Democratization by 
Elections"; Donno, “Elections in Autocracies". 
20 Schlumberger, "Dancing with Wolves". 
21 Hyde, Election Observation; Birch, Electoral Malpractice, 52. 
22 Gerschewski, “Three Pillars". 
23 Wright and Escriba-Folch, “Authoritarian Institutions". 
24 Elklit, “Electoral Institutional Change". 
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In sum, democracy aid that aligns with a regime’s survival strategy is likely to be more 
effective because regimes allow it to be implemented as intended.  
A democratic deficiency, the second component of our argument, is a political institution or 
practice that is not fully democratic. Aid targeted at particular institutions or practices is more 
effective the less democratic the institution or practice, because there is more room for 
improvement. In other words, the marginal utilities of aid decline as countries become more 
democratic.  
Democratic deficiencies can result from the intentionally undemocratic design of political 
institutions as well as weak capacity to implement the complex processes democratic governance 
requires. For instance, a clean election requires both the political commitment of the incumbent 
to refrain from manipulation and technical and financial resources. Countries without intact 
regimes face significant democratic deficiencies as a government is not even present to run 
institutions and carry out processes. Where democratic deficiencies exist, aid can help build 
capacity for institutions and processes to operate democratically.   
The fact that democratic deficiencies can be due not only to weak capacity but also to lack 
of democratic commitment underscores the regime’s central role. For aid to be effective not only 
must a democratic deficiency exist, but the aid must not threaten the regime’s survival. 
 
Regimes types and democracy aid effectiveness    
The extent to which aid is effective depends on the specific regime type or on whether an 
intact regime even exists. As Figure 1 illustrates, the level of democratic deficiencies present as 
well as the degree to which aid poses a threat to regime survival varies across the regime spectrum: 
in more authoritarian regimes (left side) deficiencies are high but threats are high too; while in 
more democratic regimes (right side) threats are low but deficiencies are low too, leading us to 
expect aid to be most effective in the middle. When aid is not a threat but does address a deficiency, 
it is effective. And, when aid is either a clear threat or does not address a deficiency, it is not 
effective.     
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Figure 1. How democratic deficiencies and threats to regime survival strategies affect 
democracy aid effectiveness 
 
 
It is common in the literature to classify political regimes by type in order to theorize about 
and empirically study patterns. We follow Lührmann’s et al. (2017) approach, which designated 
countries with intact regimes as one of  four types – closed autocracy, electoral autocracy, electoral 
democracy, and liberal democracy (Table 1).  The regime types range from non-democratic to 
democratic, as the x-axis in Figure 1 depicts. 
We depart from Cornell’s approach, which examines regime types that differ by 
composition of the ruling coalition: monarchies, military regimes, one-party regimes and 
multiparty autocracies.25 We argue that it is not the characteristics of the individuals in power that 
matter for democracy aid effectiveness, but rather the extent to which regime survival strategies 
are compatible with democracy aid. Cornell argues that democracy aid would be least threatening 
to one-party regimes, because they are the most stable regime type. However, for many one-party 
regimes – China or North Korea for instance – democracy aid poses an existential threat, because 
it challenges their strategy of severe repression of civil society and political competition. Therefore, 
we find a regime typology that takes into account the autocrat’s strategic approach towards 
democratic institutions and practices more useful. From this angle, pure one-party regimes, 
monarchies and military regimes have a similar approach towards democracy: they do not even try 
to appear democratic as they do not even allow multiparty elections. Hence, such “pure autocrats” 
can be expected to view any attempt at democratic reform – such as democracy aid – as a threat 
                                               
25 Cornell, “Regime Type and Democracy Aid". 
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to their survival and try to block its effective implementation. Thus, we follow Lührmann’s et al. 
(2017)approach of combining these regimes into the category of closed autocracies.    
Closed autocracies either hold no elections or formally restrict the competitiveness of 
elections, such as one-party regimes without a choice on the ballot. In addition, regimes with 
elections only for the legislature fall into this category, because the chief executive remains 
unaccountable to voters.26 Thus, central to this regime type is the formal exclusion of the chief 
executive from electoral competition. Also common is repression of opposition year-round 
through control of the media and stifling of civil society; this ensures that these will not effectively 
challenge the formal electoral restrictions and will otherwise have difficulty holding the regime 
accountable.  In addition, violations of human rights typically deter extra-institutional means of 
replacing the incumbent, such as mass street protests. Democracy aid, which includes promotion 
of civil society, high-quality elections, free media, and human rights, could address multiple 
democratic deficiencies, yet the second condition does not hold:  democracy aid poses a substantial 
threat to the regime. Consequently, aggregate democracy aid is not effective.    
 Electoral autocracies, unlike closed autocracies, allow for a wide variety of democratic 
institutions and processes to exist and operate, but citizens cannot use them to fully contest. The 
survival strategy of these regimes is to present themselves democratic, while still applying 
authoritarian practices.27 Democratic appearance can help bring more international aid and foreign 
direct investments from democratic countries and organizations.28 Domestically, this seemingly 
pro-democratic stance can boost legitimacy and reduce pressure from opponents. A common 
tactic by these regimes is to allow for de jure multi-party contestation, but prevent elections from 
being free and fair.29 For instance, Sudan’s long-standing dictator Omar Al-Bashir gained national 
and international credibility from well-publicized foreign aid to the 2010 elections, but nevertheless 
severely manipulated them.30 We expect democracy aid to electoral autocracies to be moderately 
effective due to significant democratic deficiencies and moderate compatibility of aid with the 
regime’s survival strategy of appearing somewhat democratic.  
 Electoral democracies, as their name indicates, exhibit strengths in electoral institutions and 
processes, but show some deficiencies in one or more other components of democracy, in 
particular civil liberties and rule of law.31 The survival strategy of these regimes is grounded in 
democracy: they have come to power and continue to govern thanks to democratic practices and 
                                               
26 Schedler, "Authoritarian Elections," 309. 
27 Schedler Schedler, “Menu of Manipulation". 
28 Hyde, Election Observation, 114. 
29 Roessler and Howard, "Democratization by Elections"; Donno, “Elections in Autocracies". 
30 Zahar, “Norm Transmission". 
31 Diamond, “Hybrid Regimes"; Schedler, “Menu of Manipulation". 
 10 
institutions and society is more likely to hold them to this commitment, than in electoral 
autocracies.32 Because electoral democracies exhibit deficiencies in sectors (other than elections) 
and because democracy aid poses little threat to their survival, we expect democracy aid to be 
moderately effective.  
 Liberal democracies are characterized by the integrity of democratic institutions and 
processes, such as a vibrant civil society, free and fair elections, an independent press, and 
protection of human rights. Consequently both the threat of democracy aid to regime survival 
strategies and democratic deficiencies are relatively minimal. Subsequently, democracy aid is 
expected to not be effective.  
Regimeless countries are those where formerly binding rules of access to and exercise of state 
powers are no longer operational and a new order has not been fully institutionalized.33 There is 
no intact regime, so there is no regime survival strategy. Democratic deficiencies are significant 
because institutions and processes have dissolved and a regime does not exist to enforce rights. 
Interim governments or societal factions can be expected to collaborate constructively with 
democracy aid providers because they have a strategic interest in establishing a political regime 
with the help of legitimizing processes such as elections. Democratic deficiencies are significant in 
each sector because institutions and processes have dissolved. For these reasons, we expect that 
democracy aid to regimeless countries will be highly effective. For instance in Libya in 2012, 
interim authorities used international democracy effectively to organize the first Post-Gadhafi 
election in a professional and credible manner.34   
Table 1. Democratic deficiencies and threats to regime survival strategies by regime types 
 Regimeless 
country 
Intact Regime 
Closed 
autocracy 
Electoral 
autocracy 
Electoral 
democracy 
Liberal 
democracy 
Democratic 
deficit High High High Moderate Low 
Democracy 
aid threat to 
regime 
survival 
strategy   
Low High Moderate Low Low 
Democracy 
aid’s 
effectiveness 
High None Moderate Moderate None 
                                               
32 Exceptions regimes backsliding to the autocratic regime spectrum such as Erdoğan’s regime in Turkey. However, 
in the time period under investigation, only 6% of electoral democracies experienced such breakdown. Based on the 
regime typology outlined below, 457 country-years qualify as electoral democratic between 2002 and 2012. Only 26 
of those cases became autocratic in the subsequent year.  
33 Based on Fishman, we understand a regime as the “formal and informal organization of the centre of political 
power.” Fishman, “State and Regime", 428. We use the term regime to denote not only such institutionalized patterns 
and norms but also, following on Schedler, the actors “in formal positions of state power.” Schedler, Politics of 
Uncertainty, 21. 
34 [reference blinded for review] 
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Thus, our hypotheses about the effects of democracy aid are:  
 
H1: Democracy aid on average has a positive effect on democratization.   
H2: Democracy aid has a strong positive effect on democratization in regimeless countries.  
H3: Democracy aid has a moderate positive effect on democratization in electoral autocracies and 
electoral democracies. 
H4: Democracy aid has no effect on democratization in closed autocracies and liberal democracies.   
 
Hypotheses 1 is based on our expectations that democracy aid is effective in three out of five 
regime types, leading to an overall positive effect.  
 
II. Democracy Aid Patterns  
Democracy aid data underscore the enormity of this assistance and thus the importance of 
understanding when money is most effectively spent. The OECD data we present are from 2002 
to 2012, the complete period for which aid disbursement data are available. 
From 2002 to 2012 a considerably sum of democracy aid—24.1 billion USD— was 
distributed, as indicated by the solid line in Figure 1. As noted above, democracy aid typically went 
to promote civil society, elections, media and human rights. As described by the OECD, civil 
society aid includes aid for civil society organizations and civic education; it excludes aid to support 
elections.35 Election aid is assistance for voter education, for election management bodies to run 
elections, and for election observation. Media aid includes activities aimed at improving the 
technical and editorial skills of media outlets and their overall quality. Human rights aid is 
assistance for official human rights bodies and mechanisms, human rights advocacy and human 
rights education as well as human rights related aid for specific groups such as indigenous groups, 
children, and minorities.  Of these types of aid, spending on civil society aid was the greatest 
followed by human rights aid, election aid, and media aid, respectively, for most years (Figure 2).36  
 
                                               
35 The information about the specific aid categories comes from the official OECD list of Creditor-Reporting-System 
(CRS) purpose codes (downloaded from 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/documentupload/2012%20CRS%20purpose%20codes%20EN.pdf, access 15 June 
2016).  
36 Note that the OECD data also include information on aid for women empowerment and for legislatures and 
political parties. Since aid for women empowerment targets generic development rather than democracy, we do not 
include it. Aid data on legislatures and political parties are only available from 2009 onwards. This amounts for 2.2% 
of the overall democracy aid in the studied time period. Therefore, we refrain from analysing this category individually, 
but include it in the total amount of democracy aid.   
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Figure 2. Total and specific democracy aid per year (2002-2012, in million USD) 
  
Source: OECD, OECD Stat. 
 
Democracy aid is distributed in countries representing the full range of regime types. This 
is evident from Table 3 and Figure 3 below. Electoral democracies and electoral autocracies receive 
the most aid, when it is measured as total aid received between 2002 and 2012 (Table 3, column 
1). Regimeless countries receive the most aid (followed by electoral democracies and electoral 
autocracies), when it is measured as aid per capita (Table 3, column 2 and Figure 3). Closed 
autocracies and liberal democracies receive considerably less aid.37  Also evident from Table 3 is 
that each regime type has received aid in each specific category. The amount of aid per capita, 
however, varies with regime type. The highest amounts of election, human rights, civil society, and 
media aid per capita go to regimeless countries. When measured in total amounts of aid, the highest 
amount of election and media aid goes to electoral autocracies, but the highest amount of civil 
society and human rights aid goes to electoral democracies.   
 
 
                                               
37 Examples of liberal democracies receiving aid between 2002 and 2012 include Cape Verde, Costa Rica, and Uruguay.  
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Table 2. Levels of aid allocated to different regime types (2002-2012)  
Aid type Aid overall Civil society Elections Media Human Rights 
Regime type Total M N T M N T M N T M N T M N 
Closed 
autocracies 1937 1.04 31 970 0.56 30 170 0.10 24 174 0.07 27 582 0.28 31 
Electoral 
autocracies 9084 1.42 69 4738 0.75 69 1852 0.25 65 448 0.06 67 1828 0.33 69 
Electoral 
democraci
es 
8789 2.27 60 5051 1.29 59 907 0.32 57 380 0.12 55 2267 0.49 60 
Liberal 
democraci
es 
1041 1.02 23 638 0.76 23 58 0.05 21 57 0.08 20 283 0.12 23 
Regimeless 
countries 3895 3.77 16 1567 1.81 16 1423 0.90 15 261 0.26 15 540 0.72 16 
Total / 
Average 24747 1.67 129 
1296
3 0.94 
12
9 4410 0.25 122 1321 0.10 127 5500 0.36 129 
Source: OECD, OECD Stat. Note: T = Total levels of aid is the sum of aid received between 2002 and 2012 (in 
millions of USD). M = Mean aid per capita received between 2002 and 2012 (in USD). N = the number of countries 
that received aid in this regime category in this period. The total is larger than the number of countries included in the 
sample because some countries switch between regime categories.  
 
 
Figure 2. Democracy aid per capita by different regime types 2002-2012 (in USD)  
 
Source: OECD, OECD Stat.  
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III. Data and methods 
Dependent variables 
To examine the impact of democracy aid, we rely on data from Varieties of Democracy 
(V-Dem).38 We use the V-Dem Electoral Democracy Index to measure the impact of democracy aid.39 
Furthermore, we use the V-Dem Core Civil Society Index to test the effect of civil society aid, the 
Clean Elections Index for election aid, the Alternative Sources of Information Index for media aid, and the 
Civil Liberties Index for human rights aid. The indices are capable of measuring incremental change 
in institutions and practices, which reflects our definition of democracy aid effectiveness as 
incremental movement toward more democratic practices and institutions, rather than a full 
transition to democracy. All V-Dem indices score political regimes and institutions on a continuum 
varying from 0 (very autocratic) to 1 (very democratic). We measure all dependent variables in the 
year after which aid was spent.  
 
Main independent variables  
To achieve a more comprehensive and accurate picture of democracy aid effectiveness we 
rely on data about democracy aid disbursements from the OECD Development Assistance 
Committee (OECD/DAC) database, rather than aggregate commitment data from only the U.S., 
as many prior works have done. All members of the OECD/DAC record their Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) in this database.40 Disbursement information is only available 
from 2002 onwards, which is why we start our analysis in that year.41 Using the database’s detailed 
purpose codes, we are able to exclude aid for governance and rule of law, and also examine aid to 
specific democracy sectors—civil society, elections, media, and human rights. We use aid per capita 
logged to correct for population size and the skewed distribution of democracy aid, as is common 
in foreign aid studies.42 
To capture the interaction between democracy aid and regime types, we use the Regimes 
In the World typology (RIW) and add regimeless countries as an additional category. 43 The RIW 
                                               
38 Most V-Dem data are based on country-expert coding, which is aggregated in a custom-built measurement model 
to enhance reliability. Coppedge et al., V-Dem Codebook V7; Coppedge et al., V-Dem Dataset V7; Coppedge et al., V-
Dem Methodology V7. Pemstein et al., V-Dem Measurement Model. 
39 The V-Dem Electoral Democracy Index captures Dahl’s concept of Polyarchy. It measures the extent to which elections 
affect the composition of the chief executive of the country, elections are clean, suffrage is extensive, political 
associations can operate freely, there is freedom of expression and an independent media. Coppedge et al., “High 
Level Democratic Principles". 
40 Countries not reporting to the OECD/DAC tend not to provide democracy aid, such as China and Russia.   
41 OECD, OECD Stat. 
42 Wright, “Foreign Aid and Demcratization," 566. Population data are from World Bank, WDI. 
43 Lührmann et al., Regimes in the World. 
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typology utilizes V-Dem data to place each regime in a particular category and was extensively 
validated.44 Similar to our approach here, RIW defines regimes as democratic if they achieve Dahl’s 
famous institutional prerequisites of electoral democracy (freedom of association, suffrage, clean 
elections, elected executive, and freedom of expression) and hold somewhat free and fair 
multiparty elections.45 Among these regimes, those that satisfy the liberal principles of respect for 
the rule of law, respect for civil liberties, and checks and balances constraining the executive are 
coded as liberal democracies. Those that do not constrain the executive are coded as electoral democracies. 
All regimes that do not meet these criteria but hold elections for the chief executive with a minimal 
level of multiparty competition are coded as electoral autocracies. Countries are categorized as closed 
autocracies, if they do not hold multiparty elections for the chief executive. In addition to the RIW 
types, we code regimeless countries — those countries that the Polity IV dataset did not categorize 
into autocracies or democracies. They received a “Standardized Authority Code” which indicate 
that a polity is interrupted (e.g. due to foreign occupation), in a state of “complete collapse of 
central political authority,” or in a substantial transition process.46 The coding scheme is laid out 
in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Operationalization of regime types and case examples 
Closed 
Autocracies 
Electoral  
Autocracies 
Electoral 
Democracies 
Liberal 
Democracies 
 Regimeless 
Countries 
No free and fair, de-facto multiparty elections 
or minimal institutional prerequisites not 
fulfilled  
Free and fair and multiparty elections and 
minimal institutional prerequisites 
fulfilled  Polity interrupted, 
collapsed, or in 
substantial 
transition No multiparty 
elections for the 
chief executive 
Elections for the chief 
executive with a 
minimal level of 
multiparty competition 
Liberal principles 
not satisfied  
Liberal principles 
satisfied  
Jordan 2012 Nigeria 2012 Bolivia 2012 Ghana 2012 Libya 2012 
Source: Adapted from Lührmann et al., Regimes in the World, 7. 
 
Control variables  
Factors other than democracy aid also shape how democratic practices and institutions in 
a country are. To capture this, we include control variables that have commonly been found to be 
associated with democratization in previous research.47  These represent the major alternative 
explanations for increasingly democratic practices and institutions. We include GDP per capita 
                                               
44 Ibid, 15.  
45 Dahl, Polyarchy.  
46 Regimeless countries 2002 to 2012 are for example Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Iraq from 2003-2009. 
Marshall et al., Polity IV, 19. 
47 Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development; Lindberg, Democracy and Elections; Teorell, Determinants of Democratization. 
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(logged) and Trade Openness (trade as % of GDP) as levels of democracy are likely to be higher in 
wealthier countries and countries open to trade.48 In addition, we include Hanson and Sigman’s 
State Capacity measure as levels of democracy might be higher in regimes with higher state 
capacity.49 This index captures state capacity on a scale from -4 (low levels) to 4 (high levels). Post-
conflict contexts are controlled for with a binary variable, Internal Conflict, signifying whether the 
country experienced armed conflict during the five years prior to receiving democracy aid based 
on the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset.50 Post-conflict contexts are commonly viewed as 
challenging for democratization.51 We also control for the proportion of the countries’ GDP that 
is based on rents from natural resources, Natural Resources,52 as we expect this to lower levels of 
democracy.53 Election Year is a binary variable indicating if an election took place during the year of 
democracy aid disbursement because elections may facilitate democratization processes.54  
Three additional controls address effects of aid separate from the relationship we are 
studying. We include the variable Total Aid Minus Democracy Aid, which measures the amount of 
non-democracy aid the country received and is based on OECD data.55 We expect this to also 
positively affect the level of democracy.56 We also include the control Aid Dependency measured as 
aid as a proportion of the countries’ GDP, which we expect to have a negative effect.57 Finally, in 
the specific democracy aid models we include a variable measuring the amount of Total Other 
Democracy Aid the country received in order to disentangle the effect of the specific type of 
democracy aid from the effects of other types of democracy aid. Summary statistics of all variables 
are available in the appendix, A1.   
 
Methods  
We test the effects of aggregate and specific types of democracy aid on levels of democracy 
using time-series cross-sectional regression models. As we are interested in dynamics within 
countries over time, we use country fixed effects. This also controls for any potential confounding 
variables that do not change over time. In addition, all models include the control variables 
discussed in the previous section. The dependent variable is measured in the year after aid was 
                                               
48 Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development; López-Córdova and Meissner, “International Trade" 
49 Hanson and Sigman, State Capacity.  
50 Gleditsch et al., “Armed Conflict "; Teorell et al., QoG. 
51 Lindberg, Democracy and Elections; Zeeuw, “Post-Conflict Democracy Assistance". 
52 World Bank 2013. 
53 Lindberg, Democracy and Elections; Ulfelder, “Wealth and Autocracy"; Teorell, Determinants of Democratization. 
54 This indicator is based on the V-Dem variable v2eltype. Coppedge et al., V-Dem Codebook V7. 
55 OECD, OECD Stat. 
56 Wright, “Foreign Aid and Demcratization" 
57 Knack, “Aid Dependence" 
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disbursed, while all independent variables are measured in the same year in which aid was 
disbursed. Hence all independent variables are lagged one year.  
 
IV. Results 
Using these data and models, we test our four hypotheses. To test H1, we examine whether aid 
has an effect on levels of democracy the year after aid was disbursed, across all regime types (Table 
4). We also study to what extent an effect is driven by a specific type of aid. We then test H2-H4 
about the effects of aid in different regimes types (Table 5). 
In line with our expectations, (H1), we find a statistically significant positive main effect 
for democracy aid across countries in the year after it is disbursed (Model 1). We find that this 
effect is not driven by any particular sector of democracy aid. Civil society aid has a positive and 
significant effect on the quality of civil society (Model 2); election aid has a significant and positive 
effect on the quality of elections (Model 3); media aid has a significant and positive effect on the 
availability of alternative sources of information (Model 4); and human rights aid has a significant 
and positive effect on respect for civil liberties (Model 5), each in the year after aid is disbursed.  
The effects for control variables are generally in line with our expectations. Levels of 
democracy and specific components of democracy are higher in regime types other than closed 
autocracies (reference category), in regimes that receive more development aid, and in regimes 
with more trade openness. Conversely, levels of democracy and specific components of democracy 
are lower in regimes with high aid dependency and in resource-dependent regimes. The effect of 
GDP per capita is largely insignificant once these controls are taken into account. Two control 
variables have somewhat counter-intuitive effects. State capacity turns out to be consistently 
negatively correlated with levels of democracy and specific components of democracy. This is in 
line with recent research demonstrating that state capacity stabilizes not only democratic but also 
autocratic regimes, with a stronger effect in autocracies.58 In addition, our models suggest that 
countries that experienced conflict in the past five years are in fact more likely to achieve higher 
levels of democracy. Such countries might have had much scope to improve their level of 
democracy after conflict ended.  
  
                                               
58 Ham and Seim, “State Capacity". 
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Table 4. Effect of democracy aid across regime types   
Model 1  
Electoral 
Democracy 
Index  
(t+1) 
Model 2  
Core Civil 
Society Index 
(t+1) 
Model 3 
Clean 
Elections 
Index  
(t+1) 
Model 4 
Alternative 
Sources of 
Information 
Index (t+1) 
Model 5 Civil 
Liberties 
Index (t+1) 
All democracy aid per capita 
 (USD, log) 
0.027***     
(USD, log) (0.006)     
Civil society aid per capita 
(USD, log) 
 0.019*    
( S , log)  (0.008)    
Election aid per capita (USD, 
log) 
  0.065***   
(USD, log)   (0.012)   
Media aid per capita    0.089***  
(USD, log)    (0.023)  
Human rights aid per capita 
(USD, log) 
    0.028*** 
(US , log)     (0.008)    
Regime typea      
Electoral autocracies 0.119*** 0.038** 0.193*** 0.071*** 0.030*** 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.018) (0.013) (0.008)    
Regimeless countries 0.128*** 0.104*** 0.222*** 0.180*** 0.072*** 
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.024) (0.017) (0.011)    
Electoral democracies 0.213*** 0.083*** 0.336*** 0.140*** 0.074*** 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.019) (0.014) (0.009)    
Liberal democracies 0.247*** 0.096*** 0.374*** 0.142*** 0.086*** 
 (0.015) (0.017) (0.026) (0.019) (0.012)    
Total aid minus democracy aid 
per capita  
0.013*** 0.027*** 0.017** 0.020*** 0.012*** 
(per capita, USD, log) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003)    
Total other democracy aid 
capita  
 0.035*** 0.005 0.010 0.017**  
(per capita, USD, log)  (0.010) (0.013) (0.008) (0.005)    
Aid dependency  -0.002+ -0.003** -0.005** -0.003* -0.001    
(total aid as % of GDP) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)    
GDP per capita (log) 0.016+ -0.021* 0.013 -0.001 -0.006    
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.014) (0.011) (0.007)    
Trade (% GDP) 3.77E-4*** 3.73E-4** 7.07E-4*** 3.03E-4* 4.32E-4*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
State capacity -0.019*** -0.043*** -0.027** -0.030*** -0.018*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.004)    
Internal conflict (past 5 yrs) 
yrsyears 
0.015* 0.012+ 0.029** 0.005 -0.000    
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.005)    
Natural resources (% GDP) -3.59E-4 -8.55E-4** -3.87E-4 -3.78E-4 -1.99E-4   
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Election year 0.008* 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.002    
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003)    
Year -0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.001    
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)    
Constant  2.700 -1.289 -2.172 1.040 -0.520    
 (2.072) (2.350) (3.439) (2.492) (1.596)    
N level 1 (country-years) 1260 1260 1260 1260 1260 
N level 2 (countries) 120 120 120 120 120 
R-squared (within) 0.343 0.204 0.327 0.217 0.204    
Time-series cross-sectional analyses, country fixed effects. P-values: +0.1, * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001, standard errors 
in parentheses.  
a. Closed autocracies is reference category.  
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Robustness checks for these models largely confirm our findings (see appendix). We show 
the robustness of our results to potential heteroskedasticity and serial autocorrelation, and run 
models using panel-corrected standard errors and a first-order autocorrelation correction (A3). 
Likewise , we find similar effects of aid on levels of democracy and its components in the two and 
three years after aid disbursement (A4). Only for civil society aid we find no effect after two and 
three years. The positive effects of aggregate aid and all specific types of aid also holds with 
different dependent variables to measure overall level of democracy and its specific dimensions 
(A5).  
Additionally, we examine to what extent selection effects might bias our results using 
Oster’s method (A6).59 This is important to ensure that our analysis does not conflate our focus—
the implementation of aid—with donors’ decisions about offering aid and regimes’ decisions about 
accepting it.  In short, we take into account that democracy aid is not allocated or accepted at 
random. The effects reported in Table 4 for democracy, elections, media and human rights aid 
hold when considering potential selection effects, but the effects for civil society aid does not.60  
Overall, the findings about aggregate aid and specific aid types are encouraging.  They 
show that democracy aid not only has an effect at the aggregate level, but also that specific types 
of democracy aid improve the components of democracy which they target. These specific 
associations provide support for the notion that democracy aid might indeed have a causal effect 
on levels of democracy. Furthermore, these findings suggest that the aggregate effect of democracy 
aid is not driven by any particular specific type of democracy aid, but can be found across 
democracy sectors.   
We next turn to testing our three hypotheses specifying the effects of overall democracy 
aid in different regimes types. We expect a strong positive effect on democratization in regimeless 
countries (H2), a moderate positive effect in electoral autocracies and democracies (H3) and no 
effect in closed autocracies and liberal democracies (H4). In order to estimate the effect of 
democracy aid in different regime types we interact democracy aid with regime types.61 
Since the coefficients of interaction effects are difficult to interpret as such, Table 5 
presents the marginal effects in each regime type. Table A2 in the appendix presents the regression 
results. 
In regimeless countries, we find aggregate democracy aid to have a relatively strong positive 
and statistically significant effect (Model 6), supporting H2. Turning to electoral autocracies, we find 
                                               
59 Oster, “Unobservable Selection". 
60 See appendix (A6) for details.  
61 Another option would be to split the sample by regime type. However, due to our relatively small sample we lack 
the statistical power to do so. 
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positive and significant effects of aggregate aid though - as we expected - the effect is slightly 
weaker than in regimeless countries. Likewise, in electoral democracies the effect of aggregate 
democracy aid is moderate and significant, supporting H3. We did not predict that democracy aid 
would be effective in liberal democracies because there are no significant deficiencies for aid to 
address. Our results support this expectation. Finally, we also expected democracy aid not to have 
a positive effect in closed autocracies because it is incompatible with the regime’s survival strategy. 
The effect of democracy aid in closed autocracies is one-tailed significant (0.095), but not 
significant in most robustness checks. Hence, our hypotheses about the effects of democracy aid 
in different regime types appear to hold.  
 
Table 5. Marginal Effects of Democracy Aid in Different Regime Types 
Regime type 
Model 6 
Electoral 
Democracy 
Index (t+1) 
Model 7 
Core Civil 
Society 
Index 
(t+1) 
Model 8 
Clean 
Elections 
Index (t+1) 
Model 9 
Alternative 
Sources of 
Information 
Index (t+1) 
Model 10 
Civil Liberties 
Index (t+1) 
Closed autocracies 0.025+ 0.028 0.356*** -0.107* 0.022 
Electoral autocracies 0.027** -0.002 0.041* 0.090*  0.027* 
Electoral democracies 0.019*  0.036** 0.005 0.104**  0.034** 
Liberal democracies -0.002 0.004 -0.051 -0.042 0.016 
Regimeless countries 0.069*** 0.022 0.103*** 0.393*** 0.010 
Marginal effects to illustrate interaction effects between democracy aid and regime type, based on time-series cross-
sectional analyses, country fixed effects. P-values: +0.1, * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001. All models include regime type in 
the year of aid allocation and additional controls as in Table 4. Regression results are presented in the appendix (A2).   
 
Turning to the effects of specific types of aid, Models 7 – 10 indicate that the general aid 
effectiveness is partially driven by specific types of aid. We find that election aid is not effective in 
electoral democracies while all other types of specific aid are - perhaps due to the fact that by definition 
electoral democracies already achieved reasonably high-quality elections. Likewise, not all types of 
aid appear effective in electoral autocracies and regimeless countries. In electoral autocracies, it appears 
that all types of aid are effective but civil society aid. This might be due to fact that many electoral 
autocracies already have a quite vibrant civil society, which is what pushed them to hold elections 
in the first place. In regimeless countries the aggregate effect of democracy aid seems to be mainly 
driven by strong effects of election and media aid, while civil society and human rights aid seem 
less effective. A possible explanation for human rights aid lacking a statistically significant effect 
might be that a strong regime is important for protecting human rights, so aid to that sector might 
be ineffective without a functioning regime.  
Finally, our findings on specific aid are consistent with the ineffectiveness of aggregate 
democracy aid in closed autocracies. However, the effect of election aid to such regimes seems to be 
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strong and statistically significant, and highly robust to alternative model specifications (see 
appendix). An explanation for this counter-intuitive finding might be that election aid might be 
compatible with the survival strategies of some leaders in closed autocracies. The immediate threat 
of election aid is limited, because of the chief executive is not up for elections. For instance, the 
Jordanian King used democracy aid to significantly improve the quality of the 2013 legislative 
elections without risking electoral defeat himself. Finally, we find a negative effect of media aid in 
closed autocracies, however this effect appears to be spurious as it is not robust to alternative 
model specifications (see appendix). In line with our findings on aggregate aid, we find no effects 
of specific types of aid in liberal democracies. 
Robustness checks largely confirm the findings presented in Table 5, unless otherwise 
discussed above. In sum, we find robust evidence that overall democracy aid is associated with 
improvements in levels of democracy in electoral autocracies, electoral democracies and regimeless 
countries. We do not find robust evidence for an overall effect of democracy aid in closed 
autocracies and in the few liberal democracies in our sample. However, it must be noted that in 
many contexts the effects of democracy aid are not very large substantively: increasing from the 
minimum to the maximum amount of aid in electoral autocracies and democracies results in a 
predicted improvement of only about 0.05 (5%) on the Electoral Democracy Index. The exception are 
regimeless countries, where the same increase in democracy aid is predicted to increase the Electoral 
Democracy Index from about 0.4 to 0.6 (representing a shift of about 20% on the 0-1 index). 
 
V. Conclusions   
This paper’s theoretical, empirical, and methodological innovations allow us to provide a more 
detailed, comprehensive, and accurate account of the successes and failures of democracy aid. In 
doing so, we are able to show how seemingly contradictory findings of large-N and small-N 
investigations of democracy aid are, in fact, complementary. Our theory outlines how threats to 
regime survival and democratic deficiencies shape the effectiveness of democracy aid in different 
regime types, which allow us to account for both large-N studies’ findings that aggregate aid is 
effective and small-N investigations’ challenges to these claims. Our novel use of OECD 
democracy aid data and V-Dem data enables us to test and provide support for this theory. 
Democracy aid is most effective in regimeless countries, shows moderate effects in electoral 
autocracies and electoral democracies and lacks effectiveness in liberal democracies and closed 
autocracies. 
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The importance of the insights about democracy aid effectiveness presented here extends 
beyond the scholarly community: they also provide guidance to policymakers and practitioners. 
They underscore that the specific regime type should be considered before aid allocation. For 
example, with the exception of election aid, we find aid to closed autocracies to be ineffective. 
Hence, donors should carefully consider whether they can plausibly achieve their goals in such 
countries or the money might be more useful elsewhere.  
The evidence that democracy aid to regimeless countries, electoral autocracies and 
democracies on average has positive effects is encouraging. But, we should also keep in mind the 
limited transformative impact of democracy aid, which is contingent on the type of regime within 
the recipient country and the specific type of democracy aid. Our results also suggest a 
reconsideration of the expectations about what democracy aid projects can achieve. Our empirical 
evidence suggests that the incremental effects of democracy aid tend to be small and short-term, 
suggesting that they are not necessarily eroding dictatorships. This supports our argument that 
leaders only allow democracy aid to be implemented as intended when aid does not threaten the 
regime survival strategy.  
Rather than cast a pall over the democracy aid enterprise, this paper provides concrete 
information that can help policymakers and practitioners increase aid effectiveness. The paper also 
opens some directions for further research. In particular the long-term effects of democracy aid 
to autocracies warrant further investigation. 
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1. Information on dependent and independent variables 
 
Table A1. Summary statistics for dependent and independent variables 
 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variables           
Electoral Democracy Index (t+1)  1260 0.50 0.22 0.03 0.93 
Core Civil Society Index (t+1) 1260 0.69 0.24 0.03 0.98 
Clean Elections Index (t+1) 1260 0.51 0.29 0 0.99 
Alternative Sources of Information Index (t+1) 1260 0.67 0.25 0.01 0.97 
Civil Liberties Index (t+1) 1260 0.67 0.21 0.06 0.97 
Independent variables           
All democracy aid per capita (USD, log) 1260 0.66 0.57 0 2.67 
Civil society aid per capita (USD, log) 1260 0.44 0.41 0 2.13 
Election aid per capita (USD, log) 1260 0.14 0.30 0 2.26 
Media aid per capita (USD, log) 1260 0.06 0.13 0 1.23 
Human rights aid per capita (USD, log) 1260 0.22 0.27 0 1.72 
Regime type 1260 2.07 1.32 0 4 
Total aid minus democracy aid per capita (USD, log) 1260 3.26 1.51 0 6.82 
Total other democracy aid - civil society aid (USD, log) 1260 0.22 0.26 0 1.87 
Total other democracy aid - election aid (USD, log) 1260 0.53 0.45 0 2.47 
Total other democracy aid - media aid (USD, log) 1260 0.61 0.51 0 2.47 
Total other democracy aid - human rights aid (USD, log) 1260 0.45 0.39 0 1.93 
Aid dependency (total aid as % of GDP) 1260 1.06 2.47 0 42.96 
GDP per capita (log) 1260 7.55 1.27 4.66 11.46 
Trade (% of GDP) 1260 82.64 37.61 21.67 321.6 
State capacity 1260 -0.18 0.88 -3.77 2.12 
Internal conflict in past 5 years 1260 0.25 0.43 0 1 
Natural resources (as % of GDP) 1260 13.55 16.61 0.00 89.33 
Election year 1260 0.28 0.45 0 1 
Year 1260 2007 3.16 2002 2012 
N = 1260 country-years and 120 countries. All aid data is in constant 2013 USD.  
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2. Regression results for marginal effects reported in Table 5 (effect of 
democracy aid by regime type) 
 
Table A2. Effect of democracy aid by regime type  
Model 6  
Electoral 
Democracy 
Index  
(t+1) 
Model 7  
Core Civil 
Society Index 
(t+1) 
Model 8 
Clean 
Elections 
Index  
(t+1) 
Model 9 
Alternative 
Sources of 
Information 
Index (t+1) 
Model 10 
Civil 
Liberties 
Index (t+1) 
All democracy aid per capita 
 (USD, log) 
0.025+     
(USD, log) (0.015)     
Civil society aid per capita 
(USD, log) 
 0.028    
(US , log)  (0.023)    
Election aid per capita (USD, 
log) 
  0.356***   
(USD, log)   (0.035)   
Media aid per capita    -0.107*  
(USD, log)    (0.050)  
Human rights aid per capita 
(USD, log) 
    0.022    
( S , log)     (0.025)    
Democracy aid * Regime type      
Dem aid * electoral autocracy 0.001 -0.030 -0.315*** 0.197** 0.006    
  (0.016) (0.025) (0.038) (0.064) (0.027)    
Dem aid * fragile regime 0.044* -0.006 -0.253*** 0.500*** -0.011    
  (0.021) (0.031) (0.041) (0.083) (0.033)    
Dem aid * electoral democracy -0.006 0.008 -0.352*** 0.211*** 0.013    
  (0.016) (0.026) (0.038) (0.059) (0.026)    
Dem aid * liberal democracy -0.027 -0.025 -0.407*** 0.065 -0.006    
  (0.022) (0.031) (0.118) (0.089) (0.038)    
Regime typea      
Electoral autocracies 0.119*** 0.050*** 0.273*** 0.058*** 0.029**  
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.013) (0.009)    
Regimeless countries 0.086*** 0.104*** 0.272*** 0.144*** 0.075*** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.026) (0.018) (0.013)    
Electoral democracies 0.218*** 0.076*** 0.418*** 0.125*** 0.071*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.020) (0.014) (0.010)    
Liberal democracies 0.261*** 0.107*** 0.453*** 0.140*** 0.087*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.027) (0.020) (0.014)    
Total aid minus democracy aid 
per capita  
0.013*** 0.027*** 0.017** 0.020*** 0.012*** 
(per capita, USD, log) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003)    
Total other democracy aid 
capita  
 0.036*** 0.003 0.006 0.017**  
(per capita, USD, log)  (0.010) (0.013) (0.008) (0.005)    
Aid dependency  -0.002* -0.003** -0.005** -0.003* -0.001    
(total aid as % of GDP) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)    
GDP per capita (log) 0.016+ -0.022* 0.007 -0.001 -0.007    
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.014) (0.010) (0.007)    
Trade (% GDP) 0.000*** 0.000** 0.001*** 0.000* 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
State capacity -0.018*** -0.043*** -0.022** -0.029*** -0.017*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.004)    
Internal conflict (past 5 yrs) 
yrsyears 
0.015* 0.012+ 0.030** 0.006 -0.001    
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.005)    
Natural resources (% GDP) -0.000 -0.001** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000    
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Election year 0.008* 0.000 0.005 0.004 0.002    
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 (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003)    
Year -0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.000 0.001    
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)    
Constant  2.679 -1.730 -3.210 1.436 -0.674    
 (2.071) (2.365) (3.313) (2.465) (1.611)    
N level 1 (country-years) 1260 1260 1260 1260 1260 
N level 2 (countries) 120 120 120 120 120 
R-squared (within) 0.350 0.209 0.379 0.245 0.205    
Time-series cross-sectional analyses, country fixed effects. P-values: +0.1, * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001, 
standard errors in parentheses.  
a. Closed autocracies is reference category.  
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A3. Robustness checks Tables 4 and 5 with different model specifications: panel-
corrected standard errors with serial autocorrelation ar(1) 
 
A3 - Table 4. Effect of democracy aid across regime types  
 
Model 1 
Polyarchy 
index 
(t+1) 
Model 2 
Core civil 
society 
index 
(t+1) 
Model 3 
Clean 
elections 
index 
(t+1) 
  Model 4 
Alternative 
sources of 
information 
index (t+1) 
Model 5 
Civil 
liberties 
index 
(t+1) 
All democracy aid per capita 0.028**         
(USD, log) (0.010)     
Civil society aid per capita  0.018*    
(USD, log)  (0.007)    
Election aid per capita   0.059**   
(USD, log)   (0.021)   
Media aid per capita    0.071*  
(USD, log)    (0.031)  
Human rights aid per capita     0.022*   
(USD, log)     (0.009)    
Regime typea      
Electoral autocracies 0.069** 0.028*** 0.092+ 0.046* 0.017    
 (0.025) (0.008) (0.049) (0.021) (0.012)    
Regimeless countries 0.072** 0.056* 0.106* 0.122*** 0.051*   
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.051) (0.026) (0.022)    
Electoral democracies 0.141*** 0.065*** 0.195** 0.100** 0.055**  
 (0.038) (0.013) (0.067) (0.033) (0.018)    
Liberal democracies 0.164*** 0.077*** 0.221** 0.093* 0.063**  
 (0.044) (0.016) (0.072) (0.042) (0.020)    
Total aid minus democracy aid 0.010* 0.016** 0.014* 0.014* 0.010*** 
(per capita, USD, log) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.003)    
Total other democracy aid  0.024+ 0.017 0.005 0.011    
(per capita, USD, log)  (0.013) (0.021) (0.014) (0.007)    
Aid dependency  -0.001 -0.002* -0.003* -0.002* -0.001*   
(total aid as % of GDP) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000)    
GDP per capita (log) 0.019** -0.021* 0.021 -0.007 -0.018+   
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.014) (0.008) (0.009)    
Trade (% of GDP) 0.000 0.000* 0.001 0.000 0.000    
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)    
State capacity -0.019** -0.040*** -0.028** -0.027*** -0.014*   
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) (0.006)    
Internal conflict (past 5 yrs) 0.012+ 0.004 0.021 0.001 -0.002    
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.013) (0.005) (0.007)    
Natural resources (% GDP) -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.000    
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)    
Election year 0.004 0.000 -0.005 0.001 0.001    
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001)    
Year -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002+   
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)    
Constant  2.405 -1.777 -1.633 -1.008 -3.294    
 (1.754) (1.745) (3.561) (1.845) (2.286)    
N level 1 (country-years) 1260 1260 1260 1260 1260 
N level 2 (countries) 120 120 120 120 120 
R-squared (overall) 0.923 0.919 0.852 0.923 0.951    
Time-series cross-sectional analyses, with country fixed effects, panel-corrected standard errors and a first-
order autocorrelation correction. P-values: +0.1, * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001, standard errors in parentheses. 
a. Closed autocracies is reference category.  
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A3 - Table A2. Effect of democracy aid by regime type 
  
Model 6 
Polyarchy 
index 
(t+1) 
Model 7 
Core civil 
society 
index (t+1) 
Model 8 
Clean 
elections 
index (t+1) 
Model 9 Alt 
sources of 
information 
index (t+1) 
Model 10 
Civil 
liberties 
index (t+1) 
Democracy aid per capita  0.034         
(USD, log) (0.032)         
Civil society aid per capita   0.019       
(USD, log)   (0.021)       
Election aid per capita     0.278***     
(USD, log)     (0.056)     
Media aid per capita       -0.051   
(USD, log)       (0.087)   
Human rights aid per capita         0.009    
(USD, log)         (0.023)    
Democracy aid * Regime type           
Dem aid * Electoral autocracy -0.011 -0.016 -0.250*** 0.126 0.013    
 (0.032) (0.020) (0.052) (0.089) (0.025)    
Dem aid * Regimeless countries 0.045 0.022 -0.172** 0.288** -0.007    
 (0.031) (0.026) (0.062) (0.109) (0.026)    
Dem aid * Electoral democracy -0.019 0.006 -0.261*** 0.134 0.022    
 (0.033) (0.024) (0.057) (0.088) (0.038)    
Dem aid * Liberal democracy -0.035 -0.012 -0.313*** 0.023 0.004    
 (0.035) (0.023) (0.070) (0.090) (0.028)    
Regime typea           
Electoral autocracies 0.077*** 0.035** 0.179*** 0.040* 0.015    
 (0.022) (0.011) (0.044) (0.019) (0.010)    
Regimeless countries 0.025 0.043 0.155** 0.103*** 0.053*   
 (0.032) (0.026) (0.056) (0.024) (0.023)    
Electoral democracies 0.156*** 0.061*** 0.281*** 0.092** 0.050**  
 (0.034) (0.014) (0.064) (0.031) (0.017)    
Liberal democracies 0.184*** 0.082*** 0.303*** 0.097* 0.062*** 
 (0.039) (0.013) (0.069) (0.041) (0.017)    
Total aid minus democracy aid 0.010** 0.017** 0.012+ 0.014* 0.010*** 
(per capita, USD, log) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.003)    
Total other democracy aid   0.025* 0.014 0.004 0.011    
(per capita, USD, log)   (0.013) (0.020) (0.013) (0.007)    
Aid dependency -0.001 -0.002* -0.003* -0.002** -0.001*   
(total aid as % of GDP) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)    
GDP per capita (log) 0.017** -0.022** 0.016 -0.008 -0.019*   
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.013) (0.007) (0.009)    
Trade (% GDP) 0.000 0.000+ 0.001 0.000 0.000    
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)    
State capacity -0.017* -0.040*** -0.024* -0.026*** -0.013*   
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.008) (0.006)    
Internal conflict (past 5 yrs) 0.011+ 0.004 0.021 0.001 -0.003    
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.015) (0.005) (0.007)    
Natural resources (% GDP) -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.000    
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)    
Election year 0.004 0.000 -0.002 0.001 0.001    
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001)    
Year -0.001 0.002+ 0.001 0.001 0.002+   
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)    
Constant  2.082 -2.199 -2.519 -0.973 -3.536    
 (1.682) (1.672) (3.362) (1.827) (2.307)    
N level 1 (country-years) 1260 1260 1260 1260 1260 
N level 2 (countries) 120 120 120 120 120 
R-squared (overall) 0.924 0.920 0.858 0.924 0.950    
Time-series cross-sectional analyses, with country fixed effects, panel-corrected standard errors and a first-
order autocorrelation correction. P-values: +0.1, * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001, standard errors in parentheses. 
a. Closed autocracies is reference category.  
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A3 - Table 5. Marginal Effects of Democracy Aid in Different Regime Types 
Regime type 
Model 6 
Polyarchy 
index (t+1) 
Model 7 
Core civil 
society 
index 
(t+1) 
Model 8 
Clean 
elections 
index 
(t+1) 
Model 9 
Alternative 
sources of 
information 
index (t+1) 
Model 10 
Civil 
liberties 
index (t+1) 
Closed autocracies 0.034 0.019 0.278*** -0.051 0.009 
Electoral autocracies 0.023+ 0.002 0.028 0.076* 0.021* 
Electoral democracies 0.015 0.024* 0.017 0.084* 0.030 
Liberal democracies -0.002 0.007 -0.035 -0.027 0.012 
Regimeless countries 0.079*** 0.041* 0.106*** 0.238*** 0.002 
Time-series cross-sectional analyses, with country fixed effects, panel-corrected standard errors and a first-
order autocorrelation correction. P-values: +0.1, * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001, standard errors in parentheses. 
a. Closed autocracies is reference category. Marginal effects of interaction effects presented in A3 – Table 
A2. 
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A4. Robustness checks Tables 4 & 5 with different lag structures for dependent 
variables 
 
4.1. Aggregate aid 
 
A4.1 - Table 4. Effect of democracy aid across regime types 
 
Model 1 
Polyarchy 
index 
(t+1) 
Model 1a 
Polyarchy 
index 
(t+2) 
Model 1b 
Polyarchy 
index 
(t+3) 
Model 1c 
Polyarchy 
index 
(av2) 
Model 1d 
Polyarchy 
index 
(av3) 
All democracy aid per capita 0.027*** 0.018* 0.018* 0.022*** 0.020*** 
(USD, log) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)    
Regime typea      
Electoral autocracies 0.119*** 0.079*** 0.034* 0.096*** 0.075*** 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010)    
Regimeless countries 0.128*** 0.120*** 0.089*** 0.119*** 0.105*** 
 (0.014) (0.017) (0.018) (0.014) (0.013)    
Electoral democracies 0.213*** 0.129*** 0.056*** 0.170*** 0.134*** 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011)    
Liberal democracies 0.247*** 0.160*** 0.079*** 0.201*** 0.160*** 
 (0.015) (0.018) (0.019) (0.015) (0.014)    
Total aid minus democracy aid 0.013*** 0.019*** 0.006 0.016*** 0.013*** 
(per capita, USD, log) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)    
Aid dependency -0.002+ -0.004** -0.001 -0.003* -0.002*   
(total aid as % of GDP) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)    
GDP per capita (log) 0.016+ 0.011 0.005 0.012 0.009    
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008)    
Trade (% of GDP) 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
State capacity -0.019*** -0.030*** -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.023*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)    
Internal conflict (past 5 yrs) 0.015* 0.010 0.005 0.012* 0.009    
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)    
Natural resources (% GDP) -0.000 -0.001+ -0.000 -0.000+ -0.000    
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Election year 0.008* 0.006 0.001 0.007* 0.005+   
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)    
Year -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.000    
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)    
Constant  2.700 2.137 -0.358 1.935 1.111    
 (2.072) (2.471) (2.751) (2.007) (1.946)    
N level 1 (country-years) 1260 1224 1187 1260 1260 
N level 2 (countries) 120 120 120 120 120 
R-squared (within) 0.343 0.202 0.089 0.293 0.236    
Time-series cross-sectional analyses, country fixed effects. P-values: +0.1, * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001, 
standard errors in parentheses. Model 1 is model presented in Table 4 in the paper, models 1a-1d test the 
robustness of these results using different lag structures for the dependent variable.  
a. Closed autocracies is reference category. 
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A4.1 - Table 5. Marginal Effects of Democracy Aid in Different Regime Types 
 
Model 6 
Polyarchy 
index (t+1) 
Model 6a 
Polyarchy 
index (t+2) 
Model 6b 
Polyarchy 
index (t+3) 
Model 6c 
Polyarchy 
index (av2) 
Model 6d 
Polyarchy 
index (av3) 
Closed autocracies 0.025+ 0.029+ 0.020 0.025+ 0.022 
Electoral autocracies 0.027** 0.016* 0.018+ 0.021* 0.018* 
Electoral democracies 0.019* 0.018* 0.021* 0.018* 0.019* 
Liberal democracies -0.002 -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 
Regimeless countries 0.069*** 0.027 0.021 0.048** 0.040** 
Time-series cross-sectional analyses, with country fixed effects. P-values: +0.1, * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001. 
Marginal effects of interaction effects between democracy aid and regime type. Model 6 is presented in 
Table 5, models 6a-6d test the robustness of these results using different lag structures for the dependent 
variable.  
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4.2. Civil society aid 
 
A4.2 – Table 4. Effect of democracy aid across regime types 
 
Model 2 
Core civil 
society 
index 
(t+1) 
Model 2a 
Core civil 
society 
index 
(t+2) 
Model 2b 
Core civil 
society 
index 
(t+3) 
Model 2c 
Core civil 
society 
index 
(av2) 
Model 2d 
Core civil 
society 
index 
(av3) 
Civil society aid per capita  0.019* 0.015 0.012 0.017* 0.015+   
(USD, log) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008)    
Regime typea      
Electoral autocracies 0.038** 0.032* 0.013 0.032** 0.024*   
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012)    
Regimeless countries 0.104*** 0.105*** 0.092*** 0.100*** 0.092*** 
 (0.016) (0.019) (0.021) (0.016) (0.016)    
Electoral democracies 0.083*** 0.042** 0.001 0.064*** 0.045*** 
 (0.013) (0.015) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013)    
Liberal democracies 0.096*** 0.048* 0.007 0.074*** 0.055**  
 (0.017) (0.020) (0.023) (0.017) (0.017)    
Total aid minus democracy aid  0.027*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 
(per capita, USD, log) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)    
Total other democracy aid 0.035*** 0.013 0.007 0.023* 0.017+   
(per capita, USD, log) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010)    
Aid dependency  -0.003** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.004** -0.004*** 
(total aid as % of GDP) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)    
GDP per capita (log) -0.021* -0.019+ -0.008 -0.020* -0.017+   
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010)    
Trade (% GDP) 0.000** 0.000+ 0.000* 0.000* 0.000*   
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
State capacity -0.043*** -0.051*** -0.047*** -0.044*** -0.042*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)    
Internal conflict (past 5 yrs) 0.012+ 0.011 0.006 0.010 0.007    
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007)    
Natural resources (% GDP) -0.001** -0.001** -0.001+ -0.001** -0.001**  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Election year 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002    
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)    
Year 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.000    
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)    
Constant  -1.289 -1.223 1.879 -1.085 -0.212    
 (2.350) (2.809) (3.214) (2.335) (2.327)    
N level 1 (country-years) 1260 1224 1187 1260 1260 
N level 2 (countries) 120 120 120 120 120 
R-squared (within) 0.204 0.155 0.112 0.186 0.165    
Time-series cross-sectional analyses, country fixed effects. P-values: +0.1, * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001, 
standard errors in parentheses. Model 2 is model presented in Table 4 in the paper, models 2a-2d test the 
robustness of these results using different lag structures for the dependent variable.  
a. Closed autocracies is reference category. 
 
 
 
 
	 37 
A4.2 - Table 5. Marginal Effects of Democracy Aid in Different Regime Types 
 
Model 7 
Core civil 
society 
index (t+1) 
Model 7a 
Core civil 
society 
index (t+2) 
Model 7b 
Core civil 
society 
index (t+3) 
Model 7c 
Core civil 
society 
index (av2) 
Model 7d 
Core civil 
society 
index (av3) 
Closed autocracies 0.028 0.028 0.041 0.030 0.034 
Electoral autocracies -0.002 -0.023 -0.031+ -0.014 -0.022+ 
Electoral democracies 0.036** 0.045** 0.041** 0.041** 0.040** 
Liberal democracies 0.004 0.006 0.013 0.005 0.007 
Regimeless countries 0.022 0.008 -0.001 0.016 0.012 
Time-series cross-sectional analyses, with country fixed effects. P-values: +0.1, * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001. 
Marginal effects of interaction effects between civil society aid and regime type. Model 7 is model 
presented in Table 5 in the paper, models 7a-7d test the robustness of these results using different lag 
structures for the dependent variable.  
 
  
	 38 
A4.3. Election aid 
 
A4.3 - Table 4. Effect of democracy aid across regime types  
 
Model 3 
Clean 
elections 
index 
(t+1) 
Model 3a 
Clean 
elections 
index 
(t+2) 
Model 3b 
Clean 
elections 
index 
(t+3) 
Model 3c 
Clean 
elections 
index 
(av2) 
Model 3d 
Clean 
elections 
index 
(av3) 
Election aid per capita  0.065*** 0.022+ 0.023+ 0.044*** 0.037*** 
(USD, log) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.011) (0.010)    
Regime typea      
Electoral autocracies 0.193*** 0.128*** 0.061** 0.158*** 0.126*** 
 (0.018) (0.020) (0.022) (0.016) (0.016)    
Regimeless countries 0.222*** 0.205*** 0.135*** 0.203*** 0.172*** 
 (0.024) (0.028) (0.030) (0.022) (0.021)    
Electoral democracies 0.336*** 0.222*** 0.108*** 0.278*** 0.225*** 
 (0.019) (0.021) (0.023) (0.017) (0.017)    
Liberal democracies 0.374*** 0.259*** 0.141*** 0.316*** 0.258*** 
 (0.026) (0.029) (0.032) (0.024) (0.023)    
Total aid minus democracy aid 0.017** 0.023** -0.003 0.019*** 0.013*   
(per capita, USD, log) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)    
Total other democracy aid 0.005 0.004 0.007 0.004 0.004    
(per capita, USD, log) (0.013) (0.015) (0.016) (0.012) (0.012)    
Aid dependency  -0.005** -0.006** 0.000 -0.006** -0.003*   
(total aid as % of GDP) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)    
GDP per capita (log) 0.013 -0.002 0.009 0.004 0.006    
 (0.014) (0.017) (0.018) (0.013) (0.013)    
Trade (% of GDP) 0.001*** 0.001** 0.000+ 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
State capacity -0.027** -0.028** -0.017 -0.028*** -0.025**  
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008)    
Internal conflict (past 5 yrs) 0.029** 0.013 0.000 0.022* 0.015+   
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.010) (0.009)    
Natural resources (% GDP) -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000    
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)    
Election year 0.003 0.010 0.002 0.006 0.005    
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)    
Year 0.001 0.004+ 0.004+ 0.003 0.003+   
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)    
Constant  -2.172 -7.318+ -8.027+ -4.990 -5.598+   
 (3.439) (4.085) (4.507) (3.204) (3.076)    
N level 1 (country-years) 1260 1224 1187 1260 1260 
N level 2 (countries) 120 120 120 120 120 
R-squared (within) 0.327 0.190 0.082 0.299 0.245    
Time-series cross-sectional analyses, country fixed effects. P-values: +0.1, * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001, 
standard errors in parentheses. Model 3 is the model presented in Table 4 in the paper, models 3a-3d test 
the robustness of these results using different lag structures for the dependent variable.  
a. Closed autocracies is reference category. 
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A4.3 - Table 5. Marginal Effects of Democracy Aid in Different Regime Types 
 
Model 8 
Clean 
elections 
index 
(t+1) 
Model 8a 
Clean 
elections 
index 
(t+2) 
Model 8b 
Clean 
elections 
index 
(t+3) 
Model 8c 
Clean 
elections 
index 
(av2) 
Model 8d 
Clean 
elections 
index 
(av3) 
Closed autocracies 0.356*** 0.319*** 0.216*** 0.331*** 0.288*** 
Electoral autocracies 0.041* 0.020 0.030 0.031* 0.030* 
Electoral democracies 0.004 -0.027 -0.025 -0.011 -0.015 
Liberal democracies -0.051 -0.069 -0.054 -0.059 -0.058 
Regimeless countries 0.103*** -0.006 0.015 0.053* 0.043* 
Time-series cross-sectional analyses, with country fixed effects. P-values: +0.1, * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001. 
Marginal effects of interaction effects between election aid and regime type. Model 8 is the model 
presented in Table 5 in the paper, models 8a-8d test the robustness of these results using different lag 
structures for the dependent variable.  
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A4.4. Media aid 
 
A4.4 - Table 4. Effect of democracy aid across regime types   
 
Model 4 
Alternative 
sources of 
information 
index (t+1) 
Model 4a 
Alternative 
sources of 
information 
index (t+2) 
Model 4b 
Alternative 
sources of 
information 
index (t+3) 
Model 4c 
Alternative 
sources of 
information 
index (av2) 
Model 4d 
Alternative 
sources of 
information 
index (av3) 
Media aid per capita  0.089*** 0.090*** 0.114*** 0.089*** 0.096*** 
(USD, log) (0.023) (0.026) (0.027) (0.023) (0.022)    
Regime typea      
Electoral autocracies 0.071*** 0.044** 0.027+ 0.054*** 0.042*** 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.013) (0.012)    
Regimeless countries 0.180*** 0.113*** 0.091*** 0.144*** 0.123*** 
 (0.017) (0.020) (0.022) (0.017) (0.017)    
Electoral democracies 0.140*** 0.078*** 0.027+ 0.108*** 0.082*** 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.017) (0.013) (0.013)    
Liberal democracies 0.142*** 0.074*** 0.015 0.104*** 0.072*** 
 (0.019) (0.021) (0.023) (0.018) (0.018)    
Total aid minus democracy aid 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 
(per capita, USD, log) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)    
Total other democracy aid 0.010 -0.002 0.003 0.002 0.000    
(per capita, USD, log) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007)    
Aid dependency  -0.003* -0.003* -0.004* -0.003* -0.003*   
(total aid as % of GDP) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)    
GDP per capita (log) -0.001 -0.000 -0.005 -0.002 -0.005    
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010)    
Trade (% GDP) 0.000* 0.000+ 0.000+ 0.000* 0.000*   
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
State capacity -0.030*** -0.039*** -0.034*** -0.033*** -0.032*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)    
Internal conflict (past 5 yrs) 0.005 0.002 -0.001 0.004 0.003    
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007)    
Natural resources (% GDP) -0.000 -0.001* -0.001 -0.001 -0.001    
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Election year 0.004 0.004 -0.004 0.004 0.002    
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)    
Year -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000    
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)    
Constant  1.040 1.323 1.385 0.710 0.481    
 (2.492) (2.939) (3.277) (2.458) (2.400)    
N level 1 (country-years) 1260 1224 1187 1260 1260 
N level 2 (countries) 120 120 120 120 120 
R-squared (within) 0.217 0.118 0.082 0.175 0.148    
Time-series cross-sectional analyses, country fixed effects. P-values: +0.1, * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001, 
standard errors in parentheses. Model 4 is model presented in Table 4 in the paper, models 4a-4d test the 
robustness of these results using different lag structures for the dependent variable.  
a. Closed autocracies is reference category. 
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A4.4 - Table 6. Marginal Effects of Democracy Aid in Different Regime Types 
 
Model 9 
Alternative 
sources of 
information 
index (t+1) 
Model 9a. 
Alternative 
sources of 
information 
index (t+2) 
Model 9b. 
Alternative 
sources of 
information 
index (t+3) 
Model 9c. 
Alternative 
sources of 
information 
index (av2) 
Model 9d. 
Alternative 
sources of 
information 
index (av3) 
Closed autocracies -0.107* -0.089 0.017 -0.098* -0.060 
Electoral autocracies 0.090* 0.104* 0.129* 0.098* 0.108** 
Electoral democracies 0.104** 0.097** 0.096* 0.101** 0.097** 
Liberal democracies -0.042 -0.064 -0.152 -0.089 -0.133+ 
Regimeless countries 0.393*** 0.380*** 0.363*** 0.388*** 0.383*** 
Time-series cross-sectional analyses, with country fixed effects. P-values: +0.1, * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001. 
Marginal effects of interaction effects between media aid and regime type. Model 9 is model presented in 
Table 5 in the paper, models 9a-9d test the robustness of these results using different lag structures for the 
dependent variable.  
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A4.5. Human rights aid 
 
A4.5 - Table 4. Effect of democracy aid across regime types  
 
Model 5 
Civil 
liberties 
index 
(t+1) 
Model 5a 
Civil 
liberties 
index 
(t+2) 
Model 5b 
Civil 
liberties 
index 
(t+3) 
Model 5c 
Civil 
liberties 
index 
(av2) 
Model 5d 
Civil 
liberties 
index 
(av3) 
Human rights aid per capita 0.028*** 0.017+ 0.023* 0.022** 0.020**  
(USD, log) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008)    
Regime typea      
Electoral autocracies 0.030*** 0.016+ -0.005 0.021** 0.012    
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008)    
Regimeless countries 0.072*** 0.054*** 0.056*** 0.060*** 0.054*** 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.011) (0.010)    
Electoral democracies 0.074*** 0.034*** -0.006 0.053*** 0.035*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008)    
Liberal democracies 0.086*** 0.042** -0.001 0.063*** 0.043*** 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.015) (0.011) (0.011)    
Total aid minus democracy aid 0.012*** 0.011** 0.010* 0.012*** 0.011*** 
(per capita, USD, log) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)    
Total other democracy aid  0.017** 0.009 0.004 0.012* 0.009+   
(per capita, USD, log) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)    
Aid dependency -0.001 -0.001 -0.002+ -0.001 -0.001    
(total aid as % of GDP) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)    
GDP per capita (log) -0.006 -0.003 -0.001 -0.006 -0.006    
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006)    
Trade (% GDP) 0.000*** 0.000+ 0.000+ 0.000*** 0.000**  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
State capacity -0.018*** -0.021*** -0.018** -0.018*** -0.017*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)    
Internal conflict (past 5 yrs) -0.000 -0.001 -0.009 -0.002 -0.005    
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)    
Natural resources (% GDP) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000    
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Election year 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001    
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)    
Year 0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.000    
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)    
Constant  -0.520 0.368 1.195 -0.460 -0.342    
 (1.596) (1.863) (2.144) (1.529) (1.512)    
N level 1 (country-years) 1260 1224 1187 1260 1260 
N level 2 (countries) 120 120 120 120 120 
R-squared (within) 0.204 0.087 0.065 0.154 0.121    
Time-series cross-sectional analyses, country fixed effects. P-values: +0.1, * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001, 
standard errors in parentheses. Model 5 is model presented in Table 4 in the paper, models 5a-5d test the 
robustness of these results using different lag structures for the dependent variable.  
a. Closed autocracies is reference category. 
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A4.5 - Table 5. Marginal Effects of Democracy Aid in Different Regime Types 
 
Model 10 
Civil 
liberties 
index (t+1) 
Model 10a 
Civil 
liberties 
index (t+2) 
Model 10b 
Civil 
liberties 
index (t+3) 
Model 10c 
Civil 
liberties 
index (av2) 
Model 10d 
Civil 
liberties 
index (av3) 
Closed autocracies 0.022 0.048+ 0.073* 0.034 0.047* 
Electoral autocracies 0.027* 0.008 0.008 0.018 0.014 
Electoral democracies 0.034** 0.015 0.025+ 0.024* 0.021* 
Liberal democracies 0.016 0.003 0.013 0.008 0.007 
Regimeless countries 0.010 0.032 0.021 0.020 0.020 
Time-series cross-sectional analyses, with country fixed effects. P-values: +0.1, * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001. 
Marginal effects of interaction effects between human rights aid and regime type. Model 10 is the model 
presented in Table 5 in the paper, models 10a-10d test the robustness of these results using different lag 
structures for the dependent variable.  
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A5. Robustness checks Tables 4 & 5 with different dependent variables 
 
A5 - Table 4. Effect of democracy aid across regime types  
 
Model 1 
Liberal 
democracy 
index (t+1) 
Model 2 
Civil society 
participation 
index (t+1) 
Model 3 
Electoral 
component 
index (t+1) 
Model 4 
Freedom of 
expression 
index (t+1) 
Model 5 
Physical 
violence 
index (t+1) 
All democracy aid per capita 0.019***     
(USD, log) (0.005)     
Civil society aid per capita   0.028***    
(USD, log)  (0.008)    
Election aid per capita   0.045***   
(USD, log)   (0.008)   
Media aid per capita    0.079***  
(USD, log)    (0.021)  
Human rights aid per capita     0.027*   
(USD, log)     (0.013)    
Regime typea      
Electoral autocracies 0.057*** 0.055*** 0.179*** 0.054*** 0.014    
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)    
Regimeless countries 0.091*** 0.109*** 0.148*** 0.142*** 0.027    
 (0.012) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.017)    
Electoral democracies 0.128*** 0.082*** 0.273*** 0.122*** 0.073*** 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)    
Liberal democracies 0.166*** 0.094*** 0.305*** 0.140*** 0.081*** 
 (0.013) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.018)    
Total aid minus democracy aid 0.009** 0.016*** 0.013** 0.021*** 0.008+   
(per capita, USD, log) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)    
Total other democracy aid  0.040*** 0.006 0.014* 0.023**  
(per capita, USD, log)  (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008)    
Aid dependency  -0.001 -0.001 -0.002+ -0.003** 0.002+   
(total aid as % of GDP) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)    
GDP per capita (log) 0.015* -0.016+ 0.019+ -0.010 -0.005    
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)    
Trade (% GDP) 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
State capacity -0.010* -0.029*** -0.019** -0.028*** -0.014*   
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)    
Internal conflict (past 5 yrs) 0.013** 0.014* 0.021** 0.005 -0.014+   
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)    
Natural resources (% GDP) -0.000 -0.001* -0.000 -0.000 0.000    
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Election year 0.005+ 0.000 0.006 0.002 0.003    
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)    
Year -0.001 0.003* -0.001 -0.001 0.001    
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)    
Constant  2.748 -4.551* 1.367 1.878 -2.118    
 (1.688) (2.206) (2.381) (2.200) (2.427)    
N level 1 (country-years) 1260 1260 1260 1260 1260 
N level 2 (countries) 120 120 120 120 120 
R-squared (within) 0.261 0.183 0.372 0.232 0.124    
Time-series cross-sectional analyses, country fixed effects. P-values: +0.1, * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001, 
standard errors in parentheses.  
a. Closed autocracies is reference category.  
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A5 - Table A2. Effect of democracy aid by regime type 
  
Model 6 
Liberal 
democracy 
index (t+1) 
Model 7 
Civil society 
participation 
index (t+1) 
Model 8 
Electoral 
component 
index (t+1) 
Model 9 
Freedom of 
expression 
index (t+1) 
Model 10 
Physical 
violence 
index (t+1) 
Democracy aid per capita  0.007     
(USD, log) (0.012)     
Civil society aid per capita  0.025    
(USD, log)  (0.022)    
Election aid per capita   0.172***   
(USD, log)   (0.024)   
Media aid per capita    0.028  
(USD, log)    (0.045)  
Human rights aid per capita     0.002    
(USD, log)     (0.038)    
Democracy aid * Regime type      
Dem aid * electoral autocracy 0.015 -0.005 -0.146*** -0.000 0.049    
  (0.013) (0.024) (0.026) (0.057) (0.041)    
Dem aid * fragile regime 0.031+ -0.017 -0.066* 0.311*** -0.028    
  (0.017) (0.029) (0.029) (0.074) (0.050)    
Dem aid * electoral democracy 0.010 0.029 -0.171*** 0.037 0.030    
  (0.013) (0.024) (0.026) (0.053) (0.040)    
Dem aid * liberal democracy -0.010 -0.036 -0.180* 0.003 -0.006    
  (0.018) (0.029) (0.083) (0.079) (0.058)    
Regime typea      
Electoral autocracies 0.046*** 0.058*** 0.216*** 0.050*** 0.004    
  (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.011) (0.014)    
Regimeless countries 0.066*** 0.120*** 0.151*** 0.116*** 0.034+   
  (0.018) (0.020) (0.018) (0.016) (0.019)    
Electoral democracies 0.122*** 0.067*** 0.312*** 0.117*** 0.068*** 
  (0.013) (0.015) (0.014) (0.012) (0.015)    
Liberal democracies 0.171*** 0.111*** 0.339*** 0.138*** 0.084*** 
  (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.021)    
Total aid minus democracy aid 0.010** 0.017*** 0.012** 0.021*** 0.008+   
(per capita, USD, log) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)    
Total other democracy aid   0.040*** 0.005 0.013+ 0.022**  
(per capita, USD, log)  (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008)    
Aid dependency  -0.001 -0.002 -0.002+ -0.003* 0.002+   
(total aid as % of GDP) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)    
GDP per capita (log) 0.014* -0.018+ 0.017+ -0.006 -0.007    
  (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)    
Trade (% GDP) 0.000* 0.000** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
State capacity -0.009* -0.029*** -0.016** -0.027*** -0.014*   
  (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)    
Internal conflict (past 5 yrs) 0.013** 0.015* 0.021** 0.005 -0.014+   
  (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)    
Natural resources (% GDP) -0.000 -0.001* -0.000 -0.000 0.000    
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Election year 0.005+ 0.000 0.007+ 0.001 0.003    
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)    
Year -0.001 0.003* -0.000 -0.001 0.002    
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)    
Constant  2.621 -5.008* 0.878 2.656 -2.453    
  (1.691) (2.215) (2.323) (2.193) (2.447)    
N level 1 (country-years) 1260 1260 1260 1260 1260 
N level 2 (countries) 120 120 120 120 120 
R-squared (within) 0.265 0.192 0.406 0.248 0.128    
Time-series cross-sectional analyses, country fixed effects. P-values: +0.1, * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001, 
standard errors in parentheses.  
a. Closed autocracies is reference category.   
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A5 - Table 5. Marginal Effects of Democracy Aid in Different Regime Types 
Regime type 
Model 6 
Liberal 
democracy 
index (t+1) 
Model 7 
Civil society 
participatio
n index 
(t+1) 
Model 8 
Electoral 
componen
t index 
(t+1) 
Model 9 
Freedom of 
expression 
index (t+1) 
Model 10 
Physical 
violence 
index 
(t+1) 
Closed autocracies 0.007 0.025 0.172*** 0.028 0.002 
Electoral autocracies 0.023** 0.020+ 0.026* 0.028 0.051* 
Electoral democracies 0.017* 0.054*** 0.001 0.065* 0.033* 
Liberal democracies -0.003 -0.010 -0.008 0.031 -0.004 
Regimeless countries 0.038** 0.008 0.106*** 0.339*** -0.026 
Time-series cross-sectional analyses, with country fixed effects. P-values: +0.1, * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001. 
Marginal effects of interaction effects presented in A5 - Table A2.  
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A6. Robustness checks Table 4 Oster sensitivity analyses for selection effects 
 
Selection effects can be conceived of as a special case of omitted variable bias. Omitted 
variable bias occurs when it is not the independent variable of interest (in this case aid) 
affecting the outcome variable, but rather a third (unknown and therefore omitted) 
variable that affects both the independent and outcome variable. Selection bias occurs 
when the third unobserved variable determines whether cases are included or not in the 
sample being analysed. In order to explicitly model selection effects some studies on aid 
effectiveness use treatment or Heckman models, which require the inclusion of at least 
one instrumental variable that explains the outcome at the selection stage (in this case aid 
allocation), but not the outcome at the regression stage (in this case level of democracy).1 
However, instrumental variables only lead to valid inferences if the correlation between 
the instrumental variable and the endogenous explanatory variable is relatively strong 
(and the variable is truly endogenous). 2  Both assumptions are difficult to meet 
simultaneously for observational studies. Therefore, Oster developed a post-estimation 
test to evaluate the degree to which model coefficients are potentially affected by omitted 
variable bias.3  
 
Oster’s approach is based on the idea that if all variables affecting the outcome of 
interest (i.e. the known variables as well as unknown and therefore omitted variables) 
were included in the regression, any possible selection effects would be controlled for 
and the remaining effect of the variable of interest (in this case aid) would be the ‘true’ 
effect.4 Oster assumes that such a model would explain 100% of the variation in the 
outcome variable and hence have an R-squared of 1. Assuming that the known variables 
are at least as important for explaining the outcome as the omitted variables, Oster 
suggests a procedure for calculating the expected change in the coefficient size of the 
variable of interest that would occur if R-squared would be 1. If coefficients change very 
little, this is an indication that selection bias is not significantly affecting the results.  
 
This is a very strict test of the robustness of our findings for two reasons. First of all, 
even if all explanatory variables were included it is unlikely that a model would explain 
100% of the outcome, because there is always some degree of measurement error. 
Hence, assuming an R-squared of 1 is likely to underestimate the real effect (which Oster 
indeed demonstrates to be the case), indicating that if we still find a effect of democracy 
aid with this assumption we can be quite sure the effect is robust. Secondly, the 
assumption that omitted variables would contribute to the same extent as the observed 
variables to the variance explained of the outcome variable is also conservative. Based on 
existing accumulative research on democratization there are a large number predictors of 
democratization that we know about and do control for, so the unknown and therefore 
omitted variables are likely to have less influence. Hence, both of Oster’s assumptions 
provide a conservative test of the robustness of our findings, hence if we still find an 
effect of democracy aid, we can be quite confident that selection bias is not affecting our 
results. The test can be performed in Stata (psacalc) and is described in detail in Oster.5 
																																																								
1 Dietrich and Wright, “Foreign Aid and Change." 
2 Bound, John, David A. Jaeger, and Regina M. Baker. "Problems with Instrumental Variables Estimation 
When the Correlation between the Instruments and the Endogeneous Explanatory Variable Is Weak." 
Journal of the American Statistical Association 90, no. 430 (1995): 443-50. 
3 Oster, “Unobservable Selection". 
4 Oster, “Unobservable Selection". 
5 Oster, “Unobservable Selection". 
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Her approach already gained prominence in economics and has been used in several 
studies.6  
 
We evaluate if the findings presented in Table 4 are robust to correcting for omitted 
variable bias using Oster’s method, and find that the coefficients for aggregate 
democracy aid, election aid, media aid and human rights aid are indeed robust. The only 
model coefficient that is strongly reduced by these tests is the effect of civil society aid. 
This supports our earlier findings and it also makes intuitive sense that selection effects 
do not play a large role in our models. Because our models include country-fixed effects, 
their explanatory power is already quite high. Therefore not much variance is left which 
could be attributed to omitted variables that could cause selection bias.  
 
A6 - Table 4 – Treatment effect estimates of democracy aid  
 
Coefficient original 
model Table 4 
Treatment effect estimate 
after Oster sensitivity 
analyses 
All democracy aid per capita (USD, log) 
 (USD, log) 
0.027 0.049 
Civil society aid per capita (USD, log) 0.019 0.001 
Election aid per capita (USD, log) 0.065 0.092 
Media aid per capita (USD, log) 0.089 0.122 
Human rights aid per capita (USD, log) 0.028 0.019 
Oster sensitivity analyses to test for selection bias. Rmax = 1; Delta = 1. Oster, “Unobservable Selection". 
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Evidence from the Stock Market." American Economic Review 106.1 (2016): 165-99. 
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